Many writers have observed that default logics appear to contain the "lot tery para dox" of probability theory. This arises when a default "proof by contradiction" lets us conclude that a typical X is not a Y where Y is an unusual subclass of X.
conclude that a typical X is not a Y where Y is an unusual subclass of X.
We show that there is a similar problem with default "proof by cases" and construct a setting where we might draw a differ ent conclusion knowing a disjunction than we would knowing any particular disjunct.
Though Reiter's original formalism is ca pable of representing this distinction, other approaches are not. To represent and rea son about this case, default logicians must specify how a "typical" individual is se lected.
The problem is closely related to Simp son's paradox of probability theory. If we accept a simple probabilistic account of de faults based on the notion that one propo sition may favour or increase belief in an other, the "multiple extension problem" for both conjunctive and disjunctive knowledge vanishes.
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Introduction
The idea that intelligence, artificial or oth erwise, involves the ability to "jump" to "default" conclusions is an attractive one; if true, it would explain a lot of intelligent activity without the need for numeric prob ability distributions. The classic examplu is the "birds fly" problem. Giveu that some indi vidual tweety is a bird, we "jump" to the conclusion she flies. When we later dis cover she is an emu, we retract that defea sible conclusion and decide instead that she doesn 't fly. The first default is read as follows: if bir·d is true, and it is consistent to assume fly, then infer fly. We say this representation is in prerequisite form, since every default has a prerequisite , following the tenniuol ogy of Etherington [1987] . With the aid we conclude that Polly can fly, but we can conclude nothing else about Polly, We can also represent the knowledge as follows:
: This is in consequent form. This rep resentation is closely related to the sys tem of Poole and his colleagues [Poole et al,l987,Poole,1988] and it lets us consis tently show that if we have observed a bird, that bird is not an emu using the contra positive form of the second default. This doesn't seem unreasonable; we can give a default "proof by contradiction" that birds are (typically) not emus: if birds were emus, then birds wouldn't (typ ically) fly. But birds do (typically) fly; a contradiction.1
Although no one argues that emus aren't rare, notes that this leads to a questionable side effect sometimes called the "dingo paradox". In [Neufeld,1988] this is discussed in the context of the lot tery paradox of probability theory [Ky· burg,1988] and it is described as a vari ant of that paradox in (Neufeld and Poole,1988 ,N eufeld,1989a ,1989b . Kyburg [1988] states that the nonmonotonic logic formalisms contain the lottery paradox; and this is stated from within the camp of de fault logic in [Poole,1989] .
In this paper, we question the idea of de fault "proof by cases". Intuition suggests that if a typically implies c and b typicall y implies c, then a V b typically implies c. Suppose, however, we give to "a typicall y implies b" the probabilistic interpretation p(bla) > p(b). This is the weakest proba bilistic property we believe a default ought 1 Formally, it is possible to consistently ass ume both consequent form defaults and thus derive -.emu from bird.
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to have, whatever else a default may mean. We will say a favours b when this is true, following [Chung,1943] .2 It then becomes simple to construct a counterexample to the notion of default "proof by cases" and mul tiple extensions arise for both conjunctive and disjunctive knowledge. We conclude with discussion of the implications. to be true if we interpret defaults to mean "most" [Bacchus,1989] ).
There are some straightforward argu ments against this.
3.1 "We choose a student from the class first"
A reasonable argument is this: if we enter the any class Ci, the typical student will be a science student.
This argument does not all ow us to rep resent the different ways we might select a typical student.
If we enter Ct. but don't know which class we are in, that class favours the conclusion that the typical stu dent is a science student. But this is not the only way we might meet someone in one of those classes: if the students of the c;
have banded together to complain that the courses were too technical (for example), we might suspect that the typical member of such a group is an arts student, even though we know only that the student is a member of the disjunction of the classes. This is the heart of the problem: how is the "typical" student in c1 V c2 selected? Do we want to know whether favours(s,c1) V favours{s,c2} or favours(s, c1 Vc2J is true?
Note that Poole's "running emus" is the special case where conditioning on ei ther disjunct yields the same probabilis tic answers as conditioning on the disjunc tion. This is straightforward to prove since emu and ostrich are mutually exclusive [Neufeld,1989b] . Both quantities on the right hand side of the first equality are greater than the respective quantities on the right hand side of the sec ond and the desired inequality follows. 0 3.2 "The probability is close to 1/2 and is unininteresting"
We have been told that the probabilities in volved are too close to 1/2 to be interest ing. It is easy for the conjunctive case to construct sets a, b and c so that for arbi trary probability values v1, v2 in the open unit interval, p( cia) = p( cib) = Vt and p(ciab) = v2. To achieve a similar result for the dis junctive case, we need only create enough disjuncts. Returning to the "arts and sci ence" example, suppose we want p(sici) to be at least Vt and p(s l vr:1 ci) to be at most v2 with 0 < v2 < v1 < 1. Assume there axe k science students in every one of n classes, and there is one arts student in each class, and no arts strudent is in two of the c;. Choose k 2: vt f(1-vt ) and n 2: k(1-v2)/v2 and we obtain the desired result.
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This means we that for any interpretation of defaults as high probabilities 1-e, we can create a counterexample.
"This example is contrived"
It is just a matter of time before someone comes up with a better one; from the 1980 "nonmonotonic logic" special issue of the AI journal to the discovery of the lottery paradox in nonmonotonic logic by Kyburg [1988] was only eight years. The next sec tion describes actual instances of the para dox.
Pearl [1989] argues that these counterex amples are unimportant in most domains. This may be true, but we argue for testable and sound formalisms that eliminate un wanted inferences even if it means that cer tain apparently desirable inferences are lost.
Discussion of the paradox
This variation of the "multiple extension problem" is closely related to Simpson's [1951] paradox of probability theory, (which some think should be attributed to Yule [1903] ), which may be stated in a number of ways. Commonly (and perhaps most sur prisingly) it is the situation that happens when the truth of c is known, whether true or false, then b makes a more probable, but if the truth of cis unknown then b makes a less probable. Formally, it is the fact that there is a consistent assignment of probabil ity values so that for propositions a, b and
This situation occurs in real life; Wagner [1982] gives several examples. Possibly the most well-known, though not complete, in stance of the paradox was a study of sex bias in graduate admissions at UCB [Bickel et al,1975 ]. An example can be constructed where admissions by college are fair though campus wide statistics indicate women need higher marks to gain admission. This oc curs if most women apply to the most com petitive colleges.
Blyth [1973] states that these inequali ties are closely related to the facts shown by Chung [1942] that for propositions a, b and c there is a consistent assignment of probabilities such that either
It is a straightforward consequence of the disjunction rule that both cannot occur at once:
Proposition 2 If a is favoured separately by b and c, then a is favoured by either be or b V c. 
Suppose a does not favour either be or b V c. An ordering on these conditional probabili ties must be constrained by the following:
1. for any a, band c, p(a i bc) > p(a ic) > p( a i •bc) (the direction of the inequal ity may be reversed) ,
2. for any a , b and c, p( a ic) + p(blc) p( a bic) + p(a V bjc),
3. ifp(a ib) f:-p(a) and p(alc) f:-p(a), then some combination of outcomes of b and c must increase belief in a and some combination must decrease belief in a.
The looseness of the constraints suggests that there are many ways to order the prob abilities.
Given so many orderings, we should be surprised if there were no sur pnses.
Conclusions
Default logic and its variants were proposed as solutions to the problem of reasoning in uncertain domains when numeric prob ability distributions are unavailable. Few would disagree that such formalisms are be coming awkward even for small problems.
We show elsewhere that a system based on probability and the ideas of favouring and of condi tiona! independence seems to yield the expected answers to most of the prob lems in the nonmonotonic literature. See [Neufeld,1989b,Neufeld and Poole,1988] for details. The most important point relevant to this discussion is that such a system does not in general favour a given b V c even though both disjuncts favour a .
These results can be interpreted m a number of different ways:
1. The multiple extension problem must be discussed for disjunctive knowledge.
The question of how the "typical" in dividual in a V b is chosen must be an swered. This means that the meaning of "typical" must be specified and it will be interesting to see if this can be done without introducing a notion of randomness from probability theory. 3. Probability theory tells us that we are taking a chance of being wrong even when the odds are in our favour. The "arts and science" example shows us that some default representations will tell us to "jump" to a conclusion when the odds are against us at the outset.
We sum up with a quotation from Koop· man [1940] on the same foundational issue:
"The distinction between an asserted dis junction and a disjoined assertion is funda mental: ( u V v) = 1 must never be confused In Proceedings 4th AAAI
